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Abstract 
SSH brute force attacks are a type of network attack in which an attacker tries to 
guess the username and password of a user on the Secure Shell protocol. This kind of 
attack is simple to perform, and the results from a successfully compromised system 
can lead to a number of destructive outcomes. Because of its simplicity and potential 
payout, large networks experience many instances of these attacks in their traffic, and 
current prevention methods rely heavily on per-machine logs that, in aggregate, take up 
a large amount of space. This paper explores the usage of machine learning algorithms 
in detecting and preventing these kinds of attacks as an alternative to the firewall 
techniques used today. We use three different classifiers - naïve Bayes, K-nearest 
neighbors, and decision trees - on a publicly available dataset of labeled network flows 
to try and classify unknown network flows into benign and SSH brute force categories. 
Our results show that machine learning is very well suited for this task, with all of our 
classifiers having accuracy scores of over 85% in the classification of our test data.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 In computer and network security, a brute force attack is considered one of the 
most basic attacks, where a malicious user attempts to break into user accounts by 
trying every possibility of username and password until the correct one is found. Their 
prevalence is hardly perplexing - practically every user service requires an account 
which then requires a password for security, and as such, this kind of attack can target 
a wide variety of protocols and services. In this paper, we take a closer look at SSH 
brute force, which is a brute force attack on the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol and will be 
described in more detail in a later section. While SSH brute force may seem like a trivial 
attack in the whole realm of network security, the fact remains that large institutions, 
such as universities and large corporations, must constantly monitor and record all 
instances of such attacks - the risk to the attacker is small and the potential payout is 
incredibly large, with the possibility of accessing confidential records and other private 
information. In addition, because the attack is so simple to perform, these kinds of 
attacks are seen more often and in larger numbers than their more complicated 
counterparts. Unfortunately, because the consequences of such an attack are severe 
and the volume of attacks is so large, all failed connection attempts through SSH must 
be monitored on a per-machine basis, and thus the data storage (as log files) becomes 
quite sizable in the long run. Currently, SSH attacks are stopped by setting a maximum 
amount of connection attempts per source IP address in a certain time period. This 
approach means that every machine must have its own firewall to protect and log 
against such attacks, making this solution scale poorly in an environment with hundreds 
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or even thousands of machines, as there is no communication between those machines 
regarding their network traffic. This allows an attacker to cycle through machines in 
order to have a better chance of guessing a password without getting caught. In 
addition, like a user with a weak password, a misconfigured per-machine firewall can 
expose to attack vectors. A better solution would be to monitor all connections to all 
machines on a network through a centralized system. However, in order to set up such 
a system with per-machine firewalls, the logs of all machines would have to be 
aggregated—possibly producing an extremely large file to process—and analyzed. 
 This is why machine learning seems like a fantastic approach to this problem; 
rather than retroactively comparing the amount of connection attempts to a network 
from a source IP based on stored logged connections, a machine learning model would 
be able to proactively determine the nature of a connection based on a few features of 
the connection known by the network, such as source and destination ports. In our 
experiment we attempt to use machine learning models on previously collected data to 
determine their usefulness in classification. However, this approach can then be 
modified to potentially introduce real-time monitoring of a system by precomputed 
machine learning models. This means that the only data to be stored is the machine 
learning model itself as well as a small buffer for the incoming network connections, 
which then can be used to institute this centralized system; however, utilizing text logs 
may introduce too high a latency concern for real-time applications, which remains 
something to investigate. In such a network, any number of new machines could be 
connected and function just the same as their counterparts in terms of a network 
   6 
security standpoint - therefore, a single misconfigured firewall on a machine ceases to 
be a vulnerability. 
 
1.2 Outline 
 The following paper is structured as such: first, we will discuss the meaning of 
Secure Shell (SSH) brute force attacks and why they are a problem despite their 
simplicity. We will then explore some related works in this area, including two attempts 
to utilize machine learning in order to enforce network security. Section 4 will go over 
the basic concepts in machine learning and its applications both in network security and 
elsewhere, while Section 5 will go in detail about the three classifiers used to train our 
model, as well as their corresponding advantages and disadvantages. Section 6 will go 
over the data sets used in this experiment as well as the full experimental setup, with 
focus on preprocessing the data, the framework used to implement our machine 
learning solution, and two additional methods that were used during the training of the 
model to manipulate and validate the model. Section 7 then provides a brief overview of 
tabulated results, while Section 8 will go more in depth as to what the results mean and 
how the experiment could be improved upon. We conclude with a summary of our 
findings and thoughts on how to extend this work in the future. 
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2. SSH Brute Force 
 This paper will explore the applications of machine learning in detecting SSH 
brute force attacks. Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol used in order to perform network 
operations, most notably remote login, securely over an unsecured network by using 
public key cryptography [1]. SSH brute force attacks comprise a subset of attacks in 
which a malicious user attempts to guess the SSH login of a user on a target machine 
by attempting all possible combinations of a login and password until the correct 
combination is found [2]. Currently, this attack is prevented by monitoring all access 
attempts from a source IP address and blocking connections once a certain number of 
failed attempts is logged during a certain time period. However, this approach isn’t 
scalable as large networks which experience high volumes of brute force attacks every 
day must keep track of all source IPs that are quarantined. In addition, having a firewall 
that does this on a machine level means that attackers are able to try this approach on 
multiple machines on the same network as each machine keeps track of only the 
connections made to itself and not to other machines on the network. Thus, attackers 
may act intelligently and may avoid reaching the quota for connections to a single 
machine by cycling through a number of known machines on the network until a correct 
login is found for any one of them. This kind of attack is known as a distributed SSH 
brute force attack as it targets multiple machines on the network [3]. Thus, it is almost 
impossible to detect distributed SSH brute force attacks by utilizing firewalls on a 
machine level, which is why this paper proposes a method for detecting SSH brute force 
on a network level utilizing machine learning algorithms which are able to classify 
malicious connections in real time with a fully trained model. With this approach, 
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connection data can be aggregated from each machine’s logs and then analyzed for 
malicious connections, allowing even machine-level firewalls to act as a unified firewall 
by using our machine learning algorithm, and thus detecting both distributed and single-
target attacks without the usage of—or in tandem with—a dedicated perimeter firewall. 
 
3. Related Work 
 In their paper “Network Traffic Anomaly Detection Using Recurrent Neural 
Networks,” [4] Redford et al. attempted to use a subset of recurrent neural networks 
(RNNs) utilizing Long-Short Term Memory cells in order to learn patterns of attacks in a 
publicly available dataset of simulated network attacks; we utilized this dataset in our 
own research and we describe it in detail in Section 6. Utilizing the flow records from 
this dataset, they created two different tests. A flow record here refers to an aggregation 
of packet data over a certain time period (dictated by the protocol being used) from a 
single set of source and destination IP addresses [5]. An example of the flow record 
entries in the dataset is shown below, albeit the size of the data is much larger than 
what is shown (with 85 columns of data): 
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Figure 1: CICIDS Flow Record Examples 
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Both tests used dyads (pairs of IP address in the form IPa:IPb) in the creation of tokens, 
the neuro-linguistic programming equivalent of words, appending extra data to the end 
of the dyad to complete the token. The first test examined the importance of the protocol 
used in the attack as well as the amount of data transferred in each flow by creating 
tokens with only these attributes, while the second test created tokens with only the 
ports used in each flow record. In both cases, the RNN model was trained without 
labeled data and was expected to predict the eleventh flow record given the ten flow 
records that were given to the model previously. Their results are presented in the form 
of several Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves [6]. These curves show the 
relationship between the true positive rate and the false positive rate in the model at 
different threshold levels and are used to determine the effectiveness of a binary 
classifier system. This type of classifier system categorizes incoming data into one of 
two categories, where one category represents data points that are accepted and the 
other represents data points that are rejected based on a condition. An example of an 
ROC curve is shown below, with an additional visual for the accompanying training 
data:   
 
FP
TP
FPR
TPR
AUC
ROC
Figure 2: Example ROC Curve and Data 
   11 
 
True positive rate (TPR), or sensitivity, refers to the percentage of incoming data 
that were correctly accepted or labeled positive - that is, samples which satisfied the 
condition and the classifier correctly identified them as such, called true positives. False 
positive rate (FPR), then, refers to the percentage of data that was incorrectly accepted 
or labeled as positive - instances where the data point did not satisfy the condition and 
the classifier still identified it as a positive, called false positives. FPR can also be 
expressed as 1 – specificity; specificity refers to the percentage of incoming data that 
was correctly rejected or labeled negative. A TPR below 100% would indicate that some 
samples are being classified as positive when in reality they are negative, and any value 
of false positive rate means that the model is incorrectly classifying negatives as 
positives. As mentioned previously, a binary classifier determines the class of an 
incoming sample based on a condition—this condition is generally a minimum 
probability, or threshold, of the sample belonging in the positive class. The ROC curve 
describes the classification behavior of the model at every threshold, although the 
thresholds are not explicitly shown in the model. In the example above, the blue curve 
represents all of the actual positive samples, whereas the red curve represents all of the 
actual negative samples. The large black line separating both curves represents the 
threshold; the model accepts everything to the right of the line and rejects everything to 
the left of the line. Thus, when we classify the data, unless the model is perfect, we will 
classify some true positive samples (solid blue area above) but then also misclassify 
some negative samples as false positives (purple area to the right of the black line 
above). Optimally, the true positive rate would be 100% and the false positive rate 
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would be 0%, which can only occur when the ROC curve is a horizontal line at TPR = 1. 
This horizontal line would indicate that at every measure of FPR, we can achieve a TRP 
of 100%. An ROC curve with a slope of 1, shown in the diagram above as a dotted grey 
line, corresponds to a model which has no better predictive probability than random 
chance. Therefore, the area under this curve (AUC) is a good metric for evaluating the 
performance of predictive machine learning programs; an AUC of 1 corresponds to a 
perfect model, whereas an AUC of 0.5 corresponds to a model classifying incoming 
data no better than random chance. An AUC value of less than 0.5 shows that the 
model is classifying the categories backwards; an AUC value of 0, for example, would 
indicate that every positive value was classified as negative and vice versa. It is worth 
noting that AUC for the ROC is insensitive to imbalanced data, as this means that the 
training and testing data must have balanced classes for this metric to be accurate. 
Redford’s tests, both in cases where denial of service data is committed and included, 
show strong AUC scores for the test in which protocol and bytes transferred are 
examined, ranging from scores of 0.76 to 0.84, indicating models with moderate 
predictive capabilities. 
 Najafabadi et al. conducted a similar approach to our experiment in 2014, which 
is detailed in their paper “Machine Learning for Detecting Brute Force Attacks at the 
Network Level,” [7] and their experimental setup served as the basis for our research. 
Using an older machine learning framework named Weka2, they were able to use their 
hand-labeled dataset of flows containing network attacks in order to train a number of 
machine learning classifiers to categorize the attacks. The data were first captured 
                                               
2 https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
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using standard packet capture and transformed into flow data using a tool called SiLK, 
from the Carnegie Mellon CERT NetSA Security Suite3. Their models analyzed traffic 
from both TCP and UDP connections in the flows in order to identify any type of brute 
force attack. Their results showed AUC values of over 0.96 for all classifiers, with an 
approach called 5-Nearest Neighbors, explained in Section 5.2, producing AUC values 
of 0.9999, showing promising results in terms of classification of network attacks using 
machine learning algorithms. 
 Distributed SSH brute force attacks can be difficult to identify using current 
methods if the attacker limits the number of packets sent to the network in a certain time 
period. Many of the best distributed SSH brute force attacks can go on for weeks or 
even months in order to attack undetected. Javed and Paxton attempt to find statistical 
differences between benign failed SSH connections and low-rate distributed SSH brute 
force attacks in their paper “Detecting Stealthy, Distributed SSH Brute-Forcing,” [3] 
focusing on a parameter that summarizes aggregate activity on the network. In doing 
so, they classify users into three groups: legitimate users, singleton brute forcers, and 
low-rate distributed brute forcers. Legitimate users have a history of successful login 
attempts, whereas singleton brute forcers have a high rate of logins compared to 
distributed brute force attackers. These characteristics allow the researchers to more 
easily find instances of distributed SSH brute force on the network. They use an 8-year-
old dataset in order to do their evaluation and find that legitimate users’ failed 
authentication attempts can be described by a beta-binomial distribution. They also find 
statistically significant changes in the site-wide parameter they call the “aggregate login 
                                               
3 https://tools.netsa.cert.org/index.html 
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failure rate.” By calculating an average value for this statistic and monitoring for times 
when this statistic rises above two standard deviations away from the mean, the 
researchers find that even low-rate distributed SSH brute force attacks can be detected 
at the expense of some false positives. They further indicate that this threshold can be 
fine-tuned to sacrifice false positive rate for a shorter time-to-detect and vice versa. 
 Researchers can capture real-life attack data by setting up what is known as a 
honeypot server, where a quarantined vulnerable virtual machine is set up in order to 
capture malicious network traffic from the Internet. Sadasivam et al. performed this 
technique in order to study a variety of SSH attacks, including SSH port scanning and 
SSH brute-force, in their paper “Detection of Severe SSH Attacks Using Honeypot 
Servers and Machine Learning Techniques” [8]. The researchers first took the output of 
the packet captures and turned them into flow records. They then used the same 
machine learning framework as Najafabadi et al., named Weka, in order to classify the 
severity of the SSH attack, rather than determining the exact attack vector. In order to 
do so, they captured 14 different features from the extracted flow records and 
performed a variety of different classifications with machine learning algorithms. They 
concluded that the most significant features in their feature set were the sum of all sent 
payload bytes and the mean inter-arrival time between received packets, and that the 
best performing classifiers were the J48 Decision Tree and PART Decision Tree, which 
are both Java implementations of the C4.5 decision tree for usage in Weka.  
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4. Machine Learning 
4.1 Introduction to Machine Learning 
 Formally, a definition for machine learning is “an application of artificial 
intelligence (AI) that provides systems the ability to act without being explicitly 
programmed.” [9] That is, machine learning is an area of computer science where 
systems are programmed to learn patterns in datasets and dynamically adjust their 
behavior to presented information without human intervention. Machine learning 
programs are able to predict future events based on presented information or classify 
new data based on features of known examples. This study focuses on the latter 
application using an approach called supervised binary classification [10]. In this 
approach, data are first manually classified and fed to the machine learning program to 
create a model of the data. This training is supervised because the machine learning 
program is presented with labeled data representing a number of distinct categories in 
that data, and binary because in this study there are only two categories, which are 
explained later in this paper. The machine learning program then tries to identify 
similarities in the data using statistical analysis given a number of features to examine. 
These features can be anything from numerical to categorical data, although categorical 
data must be represented as numerical data in order to be processed, generally by 
assigning each category a distinct value. Then, once the machine learning program has 
finished training and has identified what it thinks to be the defining factors in a category, 
it can use that model to automatically classify unlabeled data presented to it. Examples 
of this include spam protection, where incoming emails are classified as safe or not 
   16 
safe/spam, and sentiment analysis, where text is classified as emotionally positive, 
neutral, or negative based on the tone and content of the text. 
 In training the machine learning model, it is necessary to fine-tune the 
parameters of the model to prevent underfitting and overfitting of the model to the data. 
Underfitting occurs when the model is unable to capture the underlying trend in the data 
correctly, exhibiting high bias but low variance4. On the other hand, an overfitted model 
captures the noise in the data and exhibits low bias but high variance. An underfitted 
model could indicate that the model used is too simple for the data presented to it, and 
an overfitted model, conversely, may indicate that the model used is too complicated for 
the data. In either case, the model is unable to generalize well to new data. The models 
we used in this experiment were fairly sophisticated, so we faced the possibility of 
overfitting the model to the data - in order to counter this, we used a technique called K-
Fold Cross Validation, which is explained in Section 6.4.  
 
                                               
4 Variance: the expectation of the squared deviation of a random variable from its mean 
Bias:  the difference between this estimator's expected value and the true value of the parameter being estimated 
  
 
Figure 3: Underfitting and Overfitting 
Image Source: https://datascientist.space/machine-learning/overfitting.html 
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4.2 Applications of Machine Learning 
 There are already several applications of machine learning that range from 
image classification and reconstruction to sentiment analysis. Image classification, for 
example, is used by some search engines to display better results for their end users by 
finding similar images more accurately; facial recognition is also a subset of this kind of 
classification. Machine learning classification problems are also seen in medical 
institutions, where a list of symptoms may be used to estimate a patient’s diagnosis or 
determine if a patient needs to be moved to intensive care [11], [12]. Especially in 
finance, machine learning has had a large impact, providing banks the ability to make 
better decisions; for example, machine learning algorithms can be used to track 
customer spending patterns, or detect account closures [13]. 
However, unlike machine learning applications in areas such as natural language 
processing and image classification, applications in network security are less prevalent. 
A possibility for this disparity stems from the fact that network security is adversarial in 
comparison to more benign applications. Hackers are constantly trying to break 
mechanisms set in place to provide security, and with machine learning solutions to 
network security also come weaknesses that may be exploited. In addition, attackers 
themselves may use machine learning algorithms for malicious purposes such as 
enhancing previous attack vectors, and for obvious reasons there exists a scarce 
amount of literature on this subject. Thus, documented machine learning applications in 
network security are mostly focused on processing large amounts of data which would 
otherwise take up too much manpower. Machine learning has tremendous applications 
in combination with techniques such as honeypots, where an intentionally vulnerable 
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machine is monitored for instances of attacks and then analyzed to understand and 
prevent future attacks. In this case, machine learning can be used to process the large 
amount of data coming from these honeypots and prepare it for further forensic 
analysis. Thus, because the consequences of a machine learning algorithm failing or 
performing sub-optimally in a network security environment are severe, care must be 
taken in their implementation and research must be conducted as to their efficacy 
before large-scale production applications of these approaches appear on the market. 
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5. Classifiers 
 In order to classify the data into categories, statistical analysis of the features is 
performed through the use of machine learning classifiers. We use three classifiers in 
our experiment in order to examine the extent to which machine learning can be utilized 
in a network security context. The naïve Bayes classifier is used to examine the ability 
of machine learning to create a compact model from the training data, but this classifier 
is unable to evaluate the interactions between the features in the feature set. 
Conversely, the K-nearest neighbors classifier does not create a model from the training 
data – instead comparing test data with the training data directly – but is able to use the 
interplay between features to better classify the test data. Finally, decision trees 
combine the best parts of both the naïve Bayes and the K-nearest neighbors classifiers 
in that a decision tree is able to create a model that includes both the individual 
contributions of the features as well as the interactions between those features in 
determining the output from the model. These classifiers are discussed in further detail 
below:  
 
5.1 Naïve Bayes 
 The naïve Bayes (NB) classifier is a set of algorithms based on Bayes’ Theorem. 
This theorem is based on conditional probability - that is, it finds the probability of one 
event occurring given that another has already occurred, such as the probability of 
going to play tennis when it is currently raining outside. This theorem is given below, 
where A and B are events, and the probability of B occurring is greater than 0: 
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Here, it is shown that the probability of event A occurring given that B is true - P(A|B) - is 
a combination of the probability of B occurring given A is true - P(B|A) - and the 
probabilities of A and B being observed independent of each other - P(A) and P(B). 
Thus, in application of this theorem to a dataset, this classifier assumes that all features 
in a dataset that are being classified are independent of each other - each feature can 
be considered event A and each label can be considered event B. During training, this 
classifier calculates the probability of an outcome (in our case, SSH brute force) given 
the value of a feature and does this calculation for all features in the feature set. When 
we attempt to classify a data point with our trained model, we look up each probability of 
the outcome given the value of the features in the data point. Those probabilities are 
multiplied and then normalized, which gives the overall probability of the outcome given 
all features in the feature set. If this probability is greater than some predetermined 
threshold, then the data point is classified as a positive - otherwise, the data point is 
classified as a negative (in our case, not SSH brute force). Thus, each feature makes 
an equal and independent contribution to the outcome of the model.  
 This classifier is known as an eager classifier, because it uses the training data in 
order to generalize to future test data using a model, which means that it does not need 
to store the training data after creating the model. Naïve Bayes also benefits from the 
fact that it only requires a small amount of training data in order to start estimating 
values for classification, because it does not need to calculate any interdependencies 
from the feature set. 
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 We chose to use this classifier in our study as it appeared to be a baseline 
algorithm for evaluating the success of a machine learning algorithm in most of the 
literature. This made sense as in general, machine learning algorithms are complex 
enough to assume interplay between features. Being able to determine the 
effectiveness of a model where all features are considered independently of one 
another provided us with information regarding how well the individual features 
contributed to our model. In addition, by comparing the success of the naïve Bayes 
classifier to the success of the two other classifiers we considered, we were able to see 
the effects of the interplay between features more clearly.  
 
5.2 K-Nearest Neighbors 
 The K-nearest neighbors (KNN) classifier tries to classify the incoming data 
points by comparing them to K data points that most closely resemble them in the 
training data (their neighbors) - the classification of a given sample is then the average 
class of its nearest neighbors [10]. Each feature in a feature set represents a dimension, 
so an n-dimensional feature set will have a corresponding n-dimensional coordinate 
system, with each dimension representing the values for a single feature. In order to do 
so, the classifier calculates the K Euclidian distances of an incoming data point to the 
data points in the training data and minimizes those K distances to find the training data 
that most approximates the sample. Once the minimum distances are determined (and 
as such, the nearest neighbors are determined), the classifier determines the most 
common classification of those data points and uses that outcome to classify the test 
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sample. A visualization with two features (X1 and X2), and thus two dimensions, is 
shown in the graphic below:  
Here, the blue point in the middle represents a sample from the test data that needs to 
be classified, and the green and gold points represent data points from the training data 
that are classified in one of two groups. If the K is set to K=3 and we employ the K-
nearest neighbors classifier, then this point will be classified as part of group 1, as from 
the nearest neighbors, there are two data points that are part of group 1 and only one 
from group 2. Thus, the majority class in this case is group 1. However, if K is expanded 
to K=7, then the test sample will be classified as belonging to group 2; now, the number 
of nearest neighbors in group 2 has risen from one to four while the number of nearest 
neighbors in group 1 has stayed the same, and as such the majority class has shifted 
from group 1 to group 2. Thus, by changing the value of K, we are able to change the 
classification of the test sample. Because of this, choosing a K is done through many 
K = 7 X2 
X1 
K = 3 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Figure 4: KNN Visualization 
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runs of training in order to determine the best K for predicting accuracy—for our 
experiment, we found we had the best results when we used a K=7.  
This is also the reason why odd values of K are most often used in K-nearest 
neighbors classification. Because the classification is based on the average class of a 
group of K data points, having an odd value of data points means that there will not be 
ties in the case of a binary classification like this experiment. If an even value of K is 
selected, the method for tie-breaking becomes either random classification or 
classification based on K minus 1 data points for those samples which have ties. As 
opposed to the eager naïve Bayes classifier, this classifier is a lazy classifier, meaning 
that it does not use the training dataset in order to create a model that generalizes to 
the testing data. Instead, it retains the entire training dataset and uses it in order to 
make comparisons during the testing phase. In addition, this classifier is a non-
parametric classifier, which means that it does not make any assumptions as to the 
statistical distribution of the training data. It instead infers classification by using the 
training data directly rather than performing regression calculations, for example, to split 
the data into categories. This makes K-nearest neighbors classification work well in both 
linear and nonlinear data, as the training data does not need to be simplified into a 
function and is instead used directly. 
 However, while the testing phase is practically non-existent in K-nearest 
neighbors classification, the fact that it stores the entire training dataset means that this 
classifier has a large memory requirement just to do the classification. Because the 
distances to all data points in the training data need to be calculated for each incoming 
test data point, this model also works quite slowly, with each calculation having a 
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minimum complexity of O(n); however, optimizations can be made to speed up the 
average-case computation (see [14]). 
 Because the current protections for SSH brute force rely on the collection of logs, 
we decided to use this classifier to see how well a machine learning approach fits into 
the current system. Although our ultimate goal was to create a compact model which 
saved space on the machines it operated on, we wanted to first see how well a machine 
learning algorithm could use the existing data to perform classification, as a KNN 
approach doesn’t explicitly generate a model and instead simply evaluates new data 
based on the training data it stores. Therefore, the concerns that a KNN classifier 
usually raises about space were less of an issue for us as we assume that machines on 
the network will already be storing this information; although, as mentioned previously, 
utilizing this approach with text logs introduces concerns with regards to latency. This 
classifier allowed us to see the effects of machine learning without fully relying on a pre-
computed model and showed the results of a machine learning algorithm that took into 
account the interplay between features.  
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5.3 Decision Trees 
 Decision trees try to classify incoming data by utilizing trees - in our case binary 
trees - where each tree leaf is a class or decision and the other nodes are used to split 
the data into their categories based on decision rules. Thus, the training data is used to 
create these decision rules. When testing data is put through the model, each data point 
traverses left or right on a node based on a condition, for example “Is the source port 
number less than 50000?”. An example of a decision tree is shown below:  
X2 ≤ 2.45 
gini = 0.6667 
samples = 150 
value = [50, 50, 50] 
gini = 0.0 
samples = 50 
value = [50, 0, 0] 
X3 ≤ 1.75 
gini = 0.5 
samples = 100 
value = [0, 50, 50] 
X2 ≤ 4.95 
gini = 0.168 
samples = 54 
value = [0, 49, 5] 
X2 ≤ 4.85 
gini = 0.0425 
samples = 46 
value = [0, 1, 45] 
X3 ≤ 1.65 
gini = 0.0408 
samples = 54 
value = [0, 47, 1] 
gini = 0.0 
samples = 47 
value = [0, 47, 0] 
gini = 0.0 
samples = 1 
value = [0, 0, 1] 
gini = 0.4444 
samples = 6 
value = [0, 2, 4] 
gini = 0.4444 
samples = 3 
value = [0, 1, 2] 
gini = 0.0 
samples = 43 
value = [0, 0, 43] 
False Tru
e
Figure 5: Example Decision Tree 
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Here, we can see that every node has a condition - for example, the first node 
checks if the variable X2 is less than 2.45. Depending on the outcome of this condition 
for the test data point, the tree is either traversed left or right - left if true and right if 
false. This continues until a leaf node (a node that does not branch further) is reached, 
where the test sample is classified based on the classification of the leaf node. During 
the training phase, the tree is constructed by finding similar characteristics for data 
points in the dataset and then splitting the dataset by this condition. In the above tree, 
we can see in the first node that there are 50 data points for each of the three 
categories. As the tree grows downwards, the tree attempts to produce leaf nodes 
which are homogenous with respect to some category. For example, in the first split, the 
resulting leaf node (when the condition is True), contains only data points from the first 
category. Thus, if the classification of test data point ends at this leaf node, the data 
point would be classified as the first category, as we can be reasonably certain that the 
data point belongs in that category based on its comparison to the training data set. 
Creating homogenous groups is not always possible, as seen in the light blue nodes in 
the tree above – this occurs when the algorithm is unable to find a statistically significant 
condition to split the remaining data. In that case, the leaf nodes may contain training 
data from multiple categories but will then use the majority category from the training 
data in the node to classify test data that reaches this node, albeit with less certainty. 
Decision trees offer another incredibly useful benefit in that it is easy to visualize the 
method by which the incoming data is classified, as opposed to some black-box 
methods like artificial neural networks. 
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 Thus, we concluded our experiment by attempting to utilize two major benefits of 
machine learning in training a model which is able to classify incoming data by itself by 
examining the interaction between the features in the training data, without the need to 
store the data after the model is created. With a decision tree, data can simply be fed 
through the tree and its classification is simply a traversal of the tree. Once the model is 
trained, it can be stored and deployed on every machine as a lightweight solution to 
SSH brute force attacks.   
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6. Methodology 
6.1 Data Set 
 In order to train the model, we employed a public dataset from the output of an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) created by the University of New Brunswick’s Canadian 
Institute for Cybersecurity in 2017, which we will refer to as the CICIDS5. The full 
dataset consists of packet captures - stored as PCAP files - for seven days’ worth of 
simulated network attacks which include denial of service attacks, Web attacks, and 
brute force attacks. However, SSH attacks only occur on one day in this dataset, and as 
such we only utilized the data from this one day in order to train our model. The full 
packet capture file from this one day of data collection was over 11GB in size, whereas 
precomputed flow records from the same data were significantly smaller at only around 
650MB—allowing for faster processing of the data—and included crucial pre-generated 
labels for the flow data that we required for training the model. The labels from the 
dataset are shown below: 
                                               
5 https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids-2017.html 
 
Label Description 
BENIGN 
(renamed “not-ssh-bruteforce” in preprocessing) 
A safe/non-attack connection.  
SSH-Patator 
(renamed “ssh-bruteforce” in preprocessing) 
An instance of SSH bruteforce attack. The 
“Patator” here refers to an open-source 
penetration testing tool used for bruteforce attacks. 
FTP-Patator 
(renamed “not-ssh-bruteforce” in preprocessing) 
An instance of FTP bruteforce attack - because we 
were focusing on SSH attacks only in our tests, 
these instances were considered “benign” or “not-
ssh-bruteforce” for the purposes of our experiment. 
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We will note that we correctly named the categories “ssh-bruteforce” and “not-ssh-
bruteforce” in our code to better reflect the nature of the data that we were training on, 
as our “not-ssh-bruteforce” category included not only instances of truly benign entries 
but also FTP brute force entries, which are out of the scope of this project. However, in 
order to aid in ease of reading this paper, we will simply refer to this “not-ssh-bruteforce” 
category as “benign” entries from this point. 
These flow records, unlike the PCAP files produced by packet captures which 
would have to be converted manually, were in the form of a CSV spreadsheet file which 
allowed us to more easily visualize and configure the feature set that we used for 
training our model. Network flows in this context refer to an aggregation of packets sent 
from one IP address to another in a certain timeframe. While standard packet captures 
benefit from timestamp information for every packet, flow records store elapsed time per 
flow and allow us to more easily calculate statistics such as the average packets 
transferred over a specified timeframe. Although we did not use this metric for our 
experiment, an aggregate statistic such as mean inter-arrival time can even be 
substituted for timestamp information from packet captures. Thus, although we lose 
information about individual packets, we felt that the nature of brute force attacks 
(where there might be a significant number of packets in a very short timeframe) meant 
that focusing on aggregate statistics was more relevant in determining the nature of an 
SSH brute force attack. 
 Upon further examination of the dataset after the experiment concluded we 
noticed that some data was inconsistent with our understanding of networks and 
network flows, particularly the flag data. We found that many flows contained only one 
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flag set, although we expected at least a SYN and ACK packet set for each network 
flow to show a completed handshake. Unfortunately, the documentation for the dataset 
was quite scarce, and the open-source tool by which the researchers at the CIC 
obtained these flows did not work on our machines, so we were unable to replicate the 
flow data ourselves. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 8.2 but is worth 
mentioning here to possibly describe some of the phenomena we experienced in 
working with this dataset. 
 
6.2 Preprocessing 
 In order to train and test on these data, we needed to have approximately the 
same number of data points within each category to prevent underfitting of the model to 
the attack data. The majority of the 400,000 entries in the dataset were benign 
TCP/UDP connections, with only 5,897 entries being SSH brute force attacks. This 
meant that if we trained on the entire dataset, the sheer amount of benign entries would 
lead to underfitting of the model to the SSH brute force entries, as the overall trend is so 
heavily favored towards the benign entries that the attack entries are essentially 
drowned out. Thus, in order to do any meaningful training on these data, we randomly 
sampled 6,000 “not-ssh-bruteforce” entries to be included in the training/testing data, 
alongside the ~6,000 “ssh-bruteforce” entries, in order to balance the classes in our 
training and testing data. If we hoped to use our models to predict data, such as the 
next possible connection in a sequence of connections, then this culling would skew our 
results as we would eliminate information regarding the frequencies of different classes 
in our dataset. However, because our experiment focused on classification, we are able 
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to do this without much consequence as each culled class still retained the majority of 
the information regarding what feature values make up each class [15]. In addition to 
this culling, we also turned our non-numerical labels into numerical data by encoding 
the categories into zeroes and ones, with zeroes representing benign entries and ones 
representing instances of SSH brute force attacks. To do this and to select the features 
that we wanted to model on, we used the Pandas Python library, which allowed us to 
read from a CSV file and represent it as a Pandas DataFrame. This DataFrame is an 
array representation of the CSV file and made it simple to work with the underlying data 
through the usage of column names and automatically indexed rows. This is the data 
structure primarily used in the framework and has strong integration with the framework 
we used to employ our machine learning classifiers.  
 
6.3 Choosing Features 
 From the dataset described above, we pulled what we believed were the most 
significant features, which we summarize in the table below. We expected to see many 
instances of connections to destination port 22, the standard SSH port. We then wanted 
to determine from which source port the connection was coming through and how much 
data was sent, and so we checked the source port, the total packets sent, and total 
bytes sent for that information; these are some of the basic characteristics of a SSH 
connection, so we wanted to check if there was any distinct pattern differences in these 
features between a regular connection and an instance of SSH brute force. The 
duration was checked in order to potentially spot instances of distributed SSH brute 
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force (with aggregated logs). In addition, we believed that there would be some pattern 
in the flag data, so we checked the 4 most common flags in SSH connections.  
Feature Description 
Source Port The source port seen in the flow 
Destination Port The destination port seen in the flow 
Total Packets The total number of packets sent in the flow 
Total Bytes The total number of bytes sent in the flow 
Duration The duration of the flow 
FIN Flag The number of observed instances of FIN flags in 
the flow 
SYN Flag The number of observed instances of SYN flags in 
the flow 
PSH Flag The number of observed instances of PSH flags in 
the flow 
ACK flag The number of observed instances of ACK flags in 
the flow 
 
We purposefully left out IP addresses in this feature set. Although relevant in 
determining the source of the attack, IP addresses in themselves do not provide any 
meaningful information about the attack itself. In our training data, many source IP 
addresses were used solely for instances of SSH brute force, and we did not want our 
model to incorrectly assume that attacks could be classified simply through determining 
the source IP address. For example, if there was only one attacker in the training data 
and their IP address was used in training the model, then the model could conclude 
incorrectly that only traffic from that IP address could be considered malicious. In 
removing these data from the feature set, we allowed the model to generalize to all IP 
addresses - that is, any IP address could be the source of an attack. This means that 
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the model could then be used to generalize outside of the network used in our case 
study.  
 
6.4 Training 
6.4.1 Framework and Implementation 
 We trained and tested our three models using a tool called SciKit-Learn6, which 
implements a number of different machine learning algorithms and facilitates the 
building of machine learning models. To begin, we first split the data into features that 
serve as the model’s input and the categories that we expect the model to output based 
on those features. We will call the collection of feature sets X and the category names Y. 
We want our feature set to predict the nature of the flow - that is, whether or not the 
connection in question is an SSH brute force attack. 
Thus, our X value for a single data point (flow record) is an array of the feature set for 
that data point, and our Y value is the label representing the category that the flow 
                                               
6 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/ 
 
Connection Source Port Destination Port Total Packets
1 49182 88 7
2 49183 88 7
3 51134 88 9
Duration
640
900
1155
Label
BENIGN
BENIGN
BENIGN
11,998 61514 53 1
11,999 49896 22 1
12,000 62252 53 2
151468
77
61649
BENIGN
BENIGN
BENIGN
X - features Y - labels
Figure 6: Features and Labels 
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corresponds to. In order to do training, validation, and testing, the data was again split 
using the train_test_split() method provided by the SciKit-Learn framework. 
Generally, training and testing data is split 75% and 25%, respectively, as these are the 
default values in SciKit-Learn. Based on the size of our dataset, we decided to allow for 
more training data, so we opted for 80% training data and 20% testing data in order to 
create models with potentially higher accuracy. The output of this function is then 4 
arrays - X_train, Y_train, X_test, and Y_test, corresponding to the X and Y values 
for the training data followed by the X and Y values for the test data. We then used the 
framework to fit and test the three classifiers mentioned previously, with each classifier 
having the default threshold, 50%. Each classifier first is trained (fitted) using the fit() 
method from each classifier, with X_train and Y_train as the parameters, and then 
validated using a K-Fold Cross Validation [16] using the StratifiedKFold() method, 
explained later in this paper. For the naïve Bayes and K-nearest neighbor classifiers, 
principal component analysis - also explained in the next section - is employed on the 
data before being fit to the model. The data are then tested by feeding the model the 
X_test values using the predict() method and comparing the output of the model to 
the Y_test values. The predict() method by default classifies the incoming data with 
a threshold of 50%. That is, if an incoming sample is 50% likely or higher to belong to 
the “ssh-bruteforce” category, then it is classified as an SSH brute force attack. We then 
compare the number of true and false negatives and positives to see if our model is 
correctly classified the test data into the benign and SSH brute force categories, as well 
as check the accuracy score of the cross validation using the cross_val_score() 
method.  
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6.4.2 Principal Component Analysis 
 In order to better prepare the dataset for our model, we apply principal 
component analysis (PCA) before the data is fit to the naïve Bayes and K-nearest 
neighbor classifiers. Principal component analysis reduces the dimensionality of our 
feature space which allows the model to focus more on the features that have a large 
impact on the categorization of the data points. In general, PCA is performed by 
maximizing the variances of the data along one axis while minimizing the residuals 
along a perpendicular axis; by doing so, the data can be represented along the first axis 
by itself without losing much information (as we expect the residuals to be small). This 
concept is illustrated below:  
For our purposes, PCA allows us to take 10 features, for example, and represent those 
10 features as 5 features, which allows the model to focus on the most important 
features while dampening the impact of less significant ones. While dropping 
Figure 7: Principal Component Analysis in Two Dimensions 
Image Source: http://alexhwilliams.info/itsneuronalblog/2016/03/27/pca/ 
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unimportant features – that is, features that have little impact over the outcome of the 
classification – altogether accomplishes this task as well, we lose whatever data those 
features added to the model, where a single feature may have had little impact but in 
aggregate could have changed the classification. Instead, principal component analysis 
creates new features which are combinations of the old feature set - these composites 
of the original features are referred to as components. Thus, we can drop the least 
significant of these components and still retain all of the information that the old feature 
set provided. SciKit-Learn provides the PCA() method to perform principal component 
analysis on the dataset, in which a value must be specified corresponding to the desired 
dimensionality of the output. For our testing purposes, we dropped our 9-dimension 
feature set into a feature set with 5 dimensions, as this seemed to produce the best 
results after trying values from 4 to 8. For example, here are some accuracy scores for 
the K-nearest neighbors classifier for the PCA values we tested: 
PCA Dimension Accuracy Score 
4 98.24% 
5 99.57% 
6 99.44% 
7 99.32% 
8 99.24% 
 
While the results are not as significant as the changes we see between models, it is 
evident that PCA allows us to have better prediction power with our classifiers. 
 
6.4.3 K-Fold Cross Validation 
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 In order to validate our training to avoid over-fitting of the model to the dataset 
before trying the model on the true test data, we employ K-Fold Cross Validation [16], 
[17]. While K-Fold Cross Validation in itself does not modify the model in any significant 
way, this method allows us to estimate the skill of the model before applying it to our 
test data by outputting a metric that describes how well the classifier is able to classify 
the training data itself. The default output from the cross_val_score() method in 
SciKit-Learn is the accuracy score of the classifier, or how many predictions the 
classifier got correct. A high score from K-Fold Cross Validation paired with a low score 
from test data indicates that the model might be overfitting to the training data; the 
model is doing a good job of classifying the training data but then cannot generalize to 
the test data. K-Fold Cross Validation first begins by shuffling the training dataset 
randomly, and then splitting that dataset into K groups, called folds. Then, cycling 
through each fold, we select that fold to be the test data, and then select all other folds 
Figure 8: K-Fold Cross Validation 
Image Source: https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/cross_validation.html 
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to be training data. We then train the classifier selected on the training data and 
evaluate the resulting model on the test data. The evaluation scores are aggregated the 
for all K groups, and the average of the evaluation scores is used to come up with a 
single evaluation score that should summarize the skill of the model. Each observation 
or data point in the dataset can only belong to a single fold, each fold is used as test 
data only once, and each fold is used to train the model K-1 times. A value of K is 
selected to produce the summary AUC value, with an optimal K producing output with 
low variance and bias. Cross validation with a low K is cheaper in computing time but 
produces results with high bias, whereas using a high K is more expensive, produces 
results with low bias, but which could have a large variance. For our dataset, we 
selected a K value of 10, which seemed like a good middle ground. 
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7. Results 
 We evaluate our performance results using three metrics which are automatically 
produced by SciKit-Learn as through the classification_report() and 
confusion_matrix() methods. The three metrics are precision, recall, and F1 score. 
Precision refers to the model’s ability not to label positive a sample that is negative, 
while recall refers to the ability of the model to find all instances of positive samples. For 
instance, a model with low precision but high recall would be able to find all instances of 
SSH brute force attack but at the cost of labeling many benign entries as malicious as 
well. The F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall - a good F1 score 
means that the model produces low false positives and false negatives, and this score 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being a perfect model (no false positives or negatives). The 
F1 score is related to the AUC score in that the F1 score examines a single point on the 
ROC curve (thus, evaluating the ROC curve at a specified cutoff threshold – for us, this 
was the default of 50%, explained in Section 6.4.1). Conversely, the AUC score takes 
the area under the ROC curve to provide an aggregate statistic for determining the 
classification capability of a model at all thresholds. The equations for Precision, Recall, 
and F1 score are given below. Accuracy is also given below although this metric is not 
calculated by our program explicitly in the classification report. Accuracy and F1 score 
are closely related to each other, with the latter focusing on the model’s ability to 
produce as many true positives possible, and the former focusing on the model’s ability 
to produce both true positives and true negatives. Thus, the F1 score is more suited to 
show the model’s ability to find instances of the positive class (in our case, SSH brute 
force connections), while the accuracy score is useful in determining the model’s overall 
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ability to classify incoming data without mistakes. We utilized the F1 score in our final 
classification results, as the goal for our experiment was to primarily detect all instances 
of SSH brute force; however, all K-fold cross validation scores are in fact accuracy 
scores as they were used to determine the overall classification power of the models on 
the training data.  !"#$%&%'(	 =   ,-,- + /-	
 "#$011		 = 		 ,-,- + /2	/1		 = 		 2,-2,- + /- + /2	
= 2 ×  !"#$%&%'( ×  "#$011!"#$%&%'( + "#$011 	
0$$6"0$7 = 	 ,- + ,2,- + ,2 + /- + /2	 
  
  In order to clarify what is meant by false positives and false negatives, the 
confusion matrix is given below: 
 Negative (Predicted) Positive (Predicted) 
Negative (Actual) True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP) 
Positive (Actual) False Negative (FN) True Positive (TP) 
 
In our case, the most important value to minimize was the false negative rate, as this 
would mean that the model is incorrectly identifying the flows of attacks as benign 
connections which would potentially allow an attacker to perform SSH brute force on the 
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network undetected. A false positive is less damaging but also should be minimized as 
this would mean that benign connections are classified as attacks and thus regular end-
users would be unable to use SSH normally. 
With this, we are able to compare the performance of the three classifiers that we 
utilized - keep in mind that this output represents a single run of the models but that the 
output from multiple runs was essentially equivalent, with scores fluctuating at most 2-
3%.  
 
7.1 Naïve Bayes 
The results for the naïve Bayes classifier are shown below: 
Naive Bayes Precision Recall F1 Score Support 
Not SSH Brute 
Force 
1.00 0.81 0.90 1318 
SSH Brute Force 0.83 1.00 0.91 1182 
Micro Average 0.90 0.90 0.90 2500 
Macro Average 0.91 0.91 0.90 2500 
Weighed Average 0.92 0.90 0.90 2500 
10-Fold Cross Validation Score (Variance) 89.92% (0.85%) 
With the following confusion matrix: 
 Negative (Predicted) Positive (Predicted) 
Negative (Actual) 1074 244 
Positive (Actual) 0 1182 
 
Although the naïve Bayes classifier performed most poorly out of the 3 classifiers 
tested, the results are still fairly high. Our goal was to get an F1 score of 75% or over, 
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and this run of the naïve Bayes classifier finished with an F1 score of 90% and an 
almost equivalent cross-validation score. Surprisingly. the model did not produce a 
single false negative on this run and instead predicted quite a few false positives. This 
means that although the predictions were not 100% correct, the model leaned towards 
being overly cautious in its classification, choosing to classify any potential attack as an 
attack, even if the flow was benign. This result is much better than the alternative, 
where sources of attacks would be classified as benign, potentially allowing attackers to 
silently compromise the system. Although not ideal for a production environment, this 
would simply mean that a human operator would have to check the correctness of the 
flagged flows and shows the power of even a simple machine learning algorithm in 
classifying SSH brute force attacks correctly. 
 
7.2 K-Nearest Neighbors 
The results for the K-nearest neighbors classifier is show below: 
KNN Precision Recall F1 Score Support 
Not SSH Brute 
Force 
1.00 0.99 0.99 1318 
SSH Brute Force 0.99 1.00 0.99 1182 
Micro Average 0.99 0.99 0.99 2500 
Macro Average 0.99 0.99 0.99 2500 
Weighed Average 0.99 0.99 0.99 2500 
10-Fold Cross Validation Score (Variance) 99.23% (0.26%) 
 
 Negative (Predicted) Positive (Predicted) 
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 With the following confusion matrix: 
 
Here we can see a significant increase in the prediction power of the classifier. Although 
this run produced 2 false negatives, the overall accuracy of this classifier shows the 
power of a more complex model in identifying SSH brute force attacks. However, the 
near-perfectness of this result, despite the cross-validation score being high as well, 
raises concerns regarding overfitting of the model to the training data. In addition, this 
model shows the tradeoff between false negatives and false positives; using this 
technique, system administrators may need to manually inspect fewer instances of false 
positives at the cost of a few false negatives. If these false negative attack instances are 
less significant (one connection in 3 hours, for example) than some more sophisticated, 
large scale attacks, then system administrators may be willing to have a few false 
negatives exist in the network. However, a system that has produces any number of 
false negatives then becomes a target for attackers to circumvent the system. 
 
7.3 Decision Tree 
The results from the decision tree classifier are shown below: 
Decision Tree Precision Recall F1 Score Support 
Not SSH Brute 
Force 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1318 
SSH Brute Force 1.00 1.00 1.00 1182 
Micro Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 2500 
Macro Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 2500 
Negative (Actual) 1304 14 
Positive (Actual) 2 1180 
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Weighed Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 2500 
10-Fold Cross Validation Score (Variance) 99.95% (0.07%) 
 
With the following confusion matrix: 
 Negative (Predicted) Positive (Predicted) 
Negative (Actual) 1318 0 
Positive (Actual) 0 1182 
 
The decision tree classifier turns out to be the most surprising result in our testing - in 
this run, the decision tree model produced flawless results, perfectly classifying both 
benign and attack flows into their respective categories. This result in particular 
prompted us to take a look at our training and testing dataset more closely, where we 
discovered that some values did not make sense to us, specifically the flag data values. 
However, having both high cross-validation scores as well as high F1 scores shows that 
with the data given, the model performed exceptionally well, showing little signs of 
overfitting or underfitting. We discuss this result further in the next section. 
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8. Further Analysis 
8.1 Decision Tree Results 
 Utilizing the CICIDS dataset, we found success in classifying unknown network 
flows into benign connections and SSH brute force attacks. While it is difficult to 
examine what allows the Naive Bayes and K-Nearest Neighbor models to work well in 
their classifications of incoming data, we were able to view the output of the decision 
tree classifier. This classifier also happened to produce the best results for this 
particular dataset. In Figure 9 below, we can see a portion of the decision tree output for 
the trial whose results are shown in Section 7. It is worth mentioning that the output of 
the decision tree changes with every trial as the tree is based on the training data 
presented to the model - because we sample benign connections from our data at 
random for every trial, the training data changes with every run of our program, and thus 
the decision tree output changes accordingly. However, from examining a number of 
outputs, we know the same basic pattern of classification exists in every tree produced, 
and so we can draw generalized conclusions from examining the tree presented here.  
 In the output in Figure 9, we first noticed that packet flags - such as SYN and 
ACK - were not particularly useful in classifying flow data to identify attacks. In fact, the 
decision tree below does not use flags at all in order to classify incoming data, which 
could explain why PCA was useful for the other two classifiers, as the dimension 
reduction would most likely target the flag data. This could be due to a number of 
factors - first, the flags may not be a good indicator of malicious intent. A failed TCP 
connection, benign or malicious, will always contain at least one SYN and one SYN-
ACK (from the client and the server, respectively), and thus intent cannot be inferred  
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Figure 9: Portion of Decision Tree for Data Listed Above 
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from the flags alone. However, if there is a pattern that is significant in the flag data, it 
could also be a possibility that the CICIDS data is faulty in some way - checking the 
documentation yielded no more information regarding how the data was collected. In 
addition, upon manual inspection of the flag data from these flow records, we found that 
many records lacked the flags that would be present during the start of a TCP 
connection. If these were omitted from the dataset, then this could have had adverse 
effects on our model.  
 In examining the decision tree further, we found that the model focuses on 
source ports, destination ports, and the number of packets transferred during the 
connection as strong indicators of malicious connections - these decisions are the ones 
labeled src_port, dst_port, and total_packets in the tree above. All connections 
that did not have port 22 (the standard TCP port for SSH connections) as a destination 
port were disregarded as SSH attacks, as the training dataset did not appear to have 
any ports configured otherwise. From the remaining subset of flow records, the model 
filtered out the connections whose source ports were greater than 53,000 and less than 
46,000. This is because most clients in a client-server TCP connection utilize ephemeral 
ports, also known as dynamic ports, which are used for short-lived connections - these 
ports are in the range 49,152 through 65,553. These source port numbers are then 
filtered further, although the reasoning for this filtering is less apparent. The model then 
examines the number of packets transferred in the connection - if the number of packets 
is greater than 34, the model considers the connection non-malicious. This makes 
sense, as we would expect that failed connections would have few transferred packets. 
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 From just these features, we can see that the model can identify the traits which 
characterize an SSH brute force attack. However, these traits are also prevalent in non-
malicious failed SSH connection attempts, which once again calls into question the 
dataset on which we train the model. It is possible that the dataset had none or few non-
malicious failed connection attempts - if this is the case, then the model would simply 
classify every failed SSH connection as malicious, which would explain the results 
above. Future testing of this model and its effectiveness would most likely yield different 
results if the training dataset was both larger and more varied in its connection types. 
 
8.2 Possible Noise 
 From a cursory glance, the results from our experiment suggest that the data 
used in testing and in training may have been too closely related (as they were taken 
from the same dataset). Thus, it is unclear whether this model would be able to 
generalize to a different dataset with the same tremendous results. As such, while the 
results here demonstrate that machine learning is able to detect the patterns which exist 
in simulated SSH brute force attacks, the results in real-world applications would most 
likely not be this strong, particularly in the case of the decision tree classifier, which 
shows a 100% true positive and true negative rate in the above experiment. In addition, 
as mentioned previously, we are unsure of the validity of the flag data in the CICIDS 
dataset - if the data was incorrect in some way then the classifier would not be able to 
draw any meaningful trend from it, and thus a large portion of our feature set would be 
unused. It is also a possibility, noted by Najafabadi et al.[7], that the usage of port 
information may lessen the impact of other more nuanced features - because the 
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number of ports is so large and the ports are used as a categorical value, the sheer 
amount of values for the source port and destination port would be enough to 
overpower features which take on one or two values when trying to classify new data. In 
addition, because the range of port values is so high, potentially ranging from 1 to 
65535 (although generally certain ports cannot be used as they are reserved for certain 
services), classifications of connections utilizing ports that were unseen during training 
may instead focus on other less significant features which may end up producing an 
incorrect classification. 
9. Conclusion 
 SSH brute force attacks are one of the most common types of attacks on a 
network, and in this experiment, we tested the usage of several machine learning 
classifiers in order to identify instances of SSH brute force in the flow records of a 
network. We trained 3 classifiers using a publicly available labeled dataset of brute force 
attacks, and then compared their performance by examining their true positive rate and 
true negative rate on a run of test data, as well as their computed AUC value from a run 
of 10-fold cross validation. In both cases we found that the machine learning classifiers 
that were tested performed with correctness rates over 85%, indicating a strong 
likelihood that machine learning can be used to classify SSH brute force attacks 
correctly in both distributed and single-target cases. 
 Of the classifiers tested, we found that the naïve Bayes classifier was a strong 
baseline but consistently performed worse than the other two classifiers tested, 
producing F1 scores on average between 0.85 and 0.92. These scores are still fairly 
high and show that even a simple model is able to classify SSH brute force attacks with 
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a large degree of success. This result is strengthened by the results of both the K-
nearest neighbors and decision tree classifiers that we tested, both of which 
consistently produced scores over 0.95, with the decision tree classifier often producing 
flawless classifications. This result, however, must be tested further, especially on 
different datasets, as it may be indicative of overfitting of the model even with the usage 
of cross validation, as the test data and training data were taken from the same, albeit 
large, dataset. Despite this, the results show a serious potential for the usage of 
machine learning algorithms in the classification and prevention of computer and 
network attacks and demonstrate the need for more research in this area.  
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10. Future Work 
 In the future, we would like to examine the usefulness of other machine learning 
algorithms on this classification problem, namely Support Vector Machines (SVMs). For 
every machine learning problem, it is unlikely that there is a prescribed best algorithm to 
use; instead, many different classifiers must be tested in order to determine the best 
one for the given problem. Thus, we would like to explore other methods for 
classification to find the one that is most optimal before conducting any more 
experiments in this field. SVMs in particular would be interesting to investigate because 
they share many advantages with the classifiers that we tested and are known for high 
accuracy scores in binary classification problems. For instance, like K-nearest 
neighbors, SVMs do not assume the data is linearly separable, so we might be able to 
have comparable or even better classification scores by using a SVMs with non-linear 
kernels. Whereas KNNs are very sensitive to outliers, SVMs with soft margins are able 
to split data more accurately for classification. In addition, SVMs generate a model 
rather than storing the training data, similar to decision trees, so they would be useful in 
areas where a lightweight approach is necessary.  
As mentioned in the introduction, we would like to be able to gather our own flow 
record data and classify it in real time using the program we have written. Although the 
functionality for real-time classification existed in our program, we were unable to test it 
at all as we did not have a dynamic flow record dataset to pull from, namely a live 
network. We would like to investigate further the impacts of using text logs for this kind 
of problem; as mentioned previously, we are unsure how much latency this approach 
would introduce, and there may be a tradeoff between detection time and correct 
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classification if we were to use our machine learning models for this purpose. We may 
find that the latency of such an approach is so high that attackers are able to penetrate 
this security measure before the classification of an attack and subsequent quarantine 
can take place. We would also like to examine the logistics of implementing such a 
system, taking a look at whether or not this kind of approach can be used standalone or 
if it is better suited as a secondary means of defense, supplementing a primary security 
measure such as a perimeter firewall. If we were able to collect packet captures and 
create flow data in real time, the classification program would be more akin to a true 
firewall, showing the possibility of this kind of classification in a production setting. We 
are currently working on a solution for converting packet captures into flow records in 
real time, using a tool from the CERT NetSA Security Suite called Yaf7.  
In addition, we would be able to use this extra program to collect traffic from 
other networks and use their flow records as test sets in order to make sure that we 
were accounting for bias within the training. Using an in-house dataset would also allow 
us the opportunity to fully understand the dataset and all of its component parts unlike 
the CICIDS dataset that we were using for this experiment. We feel that some patterns 
that may be apparent in SSH brute force attacks were lost in the training and testing 
data that we used. Results from an in-house dataset would allow us to draw more 
generalized conclusions about the usage of the three classifiers we tested for 
applications in network security and say with more certainty that machine learning 
approaches, specifically for SSH brute force, are comparable in their detection 
capabilities to a standard firewall.  
                                               
7 https://tools.netsa.cert.org/yaf/index.html 
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12. Appendix 
1. import os   
2. import pandas as pd   
3. from sklearn.preprocessing import LabelEncoder   
4. from sklearn.model_selection import cross_val_score   
5. from sklearn.model_selection import StratifiedKFold   
6. from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler   
7. from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split   
8. from sklearn.naive_bayes import GaussianNB   
9. from sklearn.neighbors import KNeighborsClassifier   
10. from sklearn.pipeline import make_pipeline   
11. from sklearn.decomposition import PCA   
12. from sklearn import metrics   
13. from sklearn import tree   
14. import graphviz   
15. from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix, classification_report   
16.    
17. path_to_data = "" #insert path to .csv file here   
18.    
19. #Opening data for processing   
20. data = []   
21. for filename in os.listdir(path_to_data):   
22.     columns = [' Source Port', ' Destination Port', ' Total Fwd Packets', \   
23.                'Total Length of Fwd Packets', ' Flow Duration', \   
24.                'FIN Flag Count', ' SYN Flag Count', ' PSH Flag Count', \   
25.                ' ACK Flag Count', ' Label']   
26.    
27.     df = pd.read_csv(path_to_data + filename, header = 0, \   
28.                      usecols=columns)[columns]   
29.    
30.     df.columns = ['src_port', 'dst_port', 'total_packets', \   
31.                   'total_bytes', 'duration', 'fin', 'syn',   
32.                   'psh', 'ack', 'label']   
33.    
34. # Renaming labels in the data   
35. for row in range(df.shape[0]):   
36.     if(df.at[row, 'label'] == "SSH-Patator"):   
37.         df.at[row, 'label'] = "ssh-bruteforce"   
38.     else:   
39.         df.at[row, 'label'] = "not-ssh-bruteforce"   
40.    
41.     # Used to dampen the effect of many ephemeral ports   
42.     if(df.at[row, 'src_port'] > 49152):   
43.         df.at[row, 'src_port'] = 49152   
44.    
45. # Sampling the non-SSH brute force entries to balance the training data   
46. df = df.drop(df[df['label'] == "not-ssh-bruteforce"].sample(frac=0.985).index)   
47. df = df.reset_index(drop=True)   
48.    
49. # Creating feature set and labels   
50. dataset = df.values   
51. X = dataset[:,0:9].astype(float)   
52. Y = dataset[:,9]   
53.    
54. # Turning labels into encoded variables   
55. # (essentially booleans for this binary classifier)   
56. le = LabelEncoder()   
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57. le.fit(Y)   
58. encoded_Y = le.transform(Y)   
59.    
60. # Splitting training and test data   
61. X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = train_test_split(X, encoded_Y, test_size=0.2)   
62.    
63. # NAIVE BAYES IMPLEMENTATION   
64. gaussian_estimator = make_pipeline(PCA(n_components=5), GaussianNB())   
65. gaussian_estimator.fit(X_train, Y_train)   
66. predictions = gaussian_estimator.predict(X_test)   
67.    
68. # Manually collecting statistics for verification   
69. i = 0   
70. correct_predictions = 0   
71. incorrect_predictions = 0   
72. true_positive = 0   
73. true_negative = 0   
74. false_positive = 0   
75. false_negative = 0   
76. for item in predictions:   
77.     if((item == 1) and (Y_test[i] == 1)):   
78.         correct_predictions += 1   
79.         true_positive += 1   
80.     elif((item == 0) and (Y_test[i] == 0)):   
81.         correct_predictions += 1   
82.         true_negative += 1   
83.     elif((item == 0) and (Y_test[i] == 1)):   
84.         incorrect_predictions += 1   
85.         false_negative += 1   
86.     elif((item == 1) and (Y_test[i] == 0)):   
87.         incorrect_predictions += 1   
88.         false_positive += 1   
89.    
90.     i += 1   
91.    
92. # Manually printing values for validation   
93. print("\n\nNAIVE BAYES")   
94. print("Total entries: %d" % (i))   
95. print("Total correct predictions: %d" % (correct_predictions))   
96. print("Total incorrect predictions: %d" % (incorrect_predictions))   
97. print("-------------- Breakdown ---------------")   
98. print("True positives: %d" % (true_positive))   
99. print("True negatives: %d" % (true_negative))   
100. print("False positives: %d" % (false_positive))   
101. print("False negatives: %d" % (false_negative))   
102.    
103. # K-fold cross validation   
104. kfold = StratifiedKFold(n_splits=10, shuffle=True)   
105. results = cross_val_score(gaussian_estimator, X_train, Y_train, cv=kfold)   
106. print("Cross Validation Results: %.2f%% (%.2f%%)" % \   
107.      (results.mean()*100, results.std()*100))   
108.    
109. # Printing accuracy results   
110. print('\nPrediction accuracy:\n')   
111. print('{:.2%}\n'.format(metrics.accuracy_score(Y_test, predictions)))   
112.    
113. # Printing classification report   
114. print(classification_report(Y_test, predictions, \   
115.       target_names=["not-ssh-bruteforce", "ssh-bruteforce"]))   
116.    
117. # Printing confusion matrix   
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118. print(confusion_matrix(Y_test, predictions))   
119.    
120.    
121. # K-NEAREST NEIGHBORS IMPLEMENTATION   
122. knn_estimator = make_pipeline(StandardScaler(), \   
123.                               PCA(n_components=5), \   
124.                               KNeighborsClassifier(n_neighbors=7))   
125.    
126. knn_estimator.fit(X_train, Y_train)   
127. predictions = knn_estimator.predict(X_test)   
128.    
129. i = 0   
130. correct_predictions = 0   
131. incorrect_predictions = 0   
132. true_positive = 0   
133. true_negative = 0   
134. false_positive = 0   
135. false_negative = 0   
136. for item in predictions:   
137.     if((item == 1) and (Y_test[i] == 1)):   
138.         correct_predictions += 1   
139.         true_positive += 1   
140.     elif((item == 0) and (Y_test[i] == 0)):   
141.         correct_predictions += 1   
142.         true_negative += 1   
143.     elif((item == 0) and (Y_test[i] == 1)):   
144.         incorrect_predictions += 1   
145.         false_negative += 1   
146.     elif((item == 1) and (Y_test[i] == 0)):   
147.         incorrect_predictions += 1   
148.         false_positive += 1   
149.    
150.     i += 1   
151.    
152. print("\n\nKNN")   
153. print("Total entries: %d" % (i))   
154. print("Total correct predictions: %d" % (correct_predictions))   
155. print("Total incorrect predictions: %d" % (incorrect_predictions))   
156. print("-------------- Breakdown ---------------")   
157. print("True positives: %d" % (true_positive))   
158. print("True negatives: %d" % (true_negative))   
159. print("False positives: %d" % (false_positive))   
160. print("False negatives: %d" % (false_negative))   
161.    
162. kfold = StratifiedKFold(n_splits=10, shuffle=True)   
163. results = cross_val_score(knn_estimator, X_train, Y_train, cv=kfold)   
164. print("Cross Validation Results: %.2f%% (%.2f%%)" % \   
165.      (results.mean()*100, results.std()*100))   
166.    
167. print('\nPrediction accuracy:\n')   
168. print('{:.2%}\n'.format(metrics.accuracy_score(Y_test, predictions)))   
169.    
170. print(classification_report(Y_test, predictions, \   
171.       target_names=["not-ssh-bruteforce", "ssh-bruteforce"]))   
172.    
173. print(confusion_matrix(Y_test, predictions))   
174.    
175.    
176. tree_estimator = tree.DecisionTreeClassifier()   
177. tree_estimator.fit(X_train, Y_train)   
178. predictions = tree_estimator.predict(X_test)   
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179.    
180. i = 0   
181. correct_predictions = 0   
182. incorrect_predictions = 0   
183. true_positive = 0   
184. true_negative = 0   
185. false_positive = 0   
186. false_negative = 0   
187. for item in predictions:   
188.     if((item == 1) and (Y_test[i] == 1)):   
189.         correct_predictions += 1   
190.         true_positive += 1   
191.     elif((item == 0) and (Y_test[i] == 0)):   
192.         correct_predictions += 1   
193.         true_negative += 1   
194.     elif((item == 0) and (Y_test[i] == 1)):   
195.         incorrect_predictions += 1   
196.         false_negative += 1   
197.     elif((item == 1) and (Y_test[i] == 0)):   
198.         incorrect_predictions += 1   
199.         false_positive += 1   
200.    
201.     i += 1   
202.    
203. print("\n\nDecision Tree")   
204. print("Total entries: %d" % (i))   
205. print("Total correct predictions: %d" % (correct_predictions))   
206. print("Total incorrect predictions: %d" % (incorrect_predictions))   
207. print("-------------- Breakdown ---------------")   
208. print("True positives: %d" % (true_positive))   
209. print("True negatives: %d" % (true_negative))   
210. print("False positives: %d" % (false_positive))   
211. print("False negatives: %d" % (false_negative))   
212.    
213. kfold = StratifiedKFold(n_splits=10, shuffle=True)   
214. results = cross_val_score(tree_estimator, X_train, Y_train, cv=kfold)   
215. print("Cross Validation Results: %.2f%% (%.2f%%)" % \   
216.      (results.mean()*100, results.std()*100))   
217.    
218. print('\nPrediction accuracy:\n')   
219. print('{:.2%}\n'.format(metrics.accuracy_score(Y_test, predictions)))   
220.    
221. print(classification_report(Y_test, predictions, \   
222.       target_names=["not-ssh-bruteforce", "ssh-bruteforce"]))   
223.    
224. print(confusion_matrix(Y_test, predictions))   
225.    
226. dot_data = tree.export_graphviz(tree_estimator, out_file=None, \   
227.            feature_names = df.columns[0:9], \   
228.            class_names = ["not-ssh-bruteforce", "ssh_bruteforce"])   
229.    
230. # Create decision tree graph   
231. graph = graphviz.Source(dot_data)   
232. graph.render("ssh_bruteforce_tree")  
 
